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INSURANCE
HERBERT A. KUVIN
Since the last survey of this subject,' the Florida courts havc reported
twenty-four decisions and the Fcdcral courts twcnty-ninc decisions. Since
the Federal courts follow the state's substantivc law, equal consideration is
given herein to all decisions without specific distinction, unless required by
the nature of the subject matter involved.
STATE REGULATIONS
The Commissioner of Insurance is not, by virtue of his official position
as a state officer, immune from accountability in an action against him and
others charging them with a conspiracy in restraint of trade. On a motion for
summary judgment by the Commissioner on the grounds that he was
immune because what he did was his official duty, it was held that since
there was no authority, statutory or otherwise, authorizing such official to
enter into any conspiracy to restrain commerce, the motion should be
denied.-
Firemen of a municipality sued for an accounting of the funds collected
by the municipality from the fire insurance companies writing business in
their jurisdiction under the excise tax law which was created for establishing
firemen's pension funds? The court held that the municipality must use the
proceeds of the tax for the benefit of firemen members and their dependents
and not for the benefit of all members of the city relief or pension flud.
The proceeds had to be segregated for the purposes intended.'
A declaratory decree determined that it was legal and proper for public
insurance adjusters to solicit business in regard to claims against insurers
for losses sustained. Part of a statut 5 applying to public insurance adjusters,
which prohibited the solicitation of business or clients, was held unconstitu-
tional as a restraint imposed on the right to contract. Nor was it based on
or reasonably justified by, the needs of public health, safety or welfare.
SCOPE AND COVERAGE OF POLICIES
Courts must apply the rules of construction to insurance contracts as
written by the parties, and even though the result compelled by the plain
t Professor of Law and Director of Insurance Law Training Program, University of
Miami School of Law.
1. 12 U. MIAMI L. REv. 450 (1958).
2. Bankers L. & C. Co. v. Larson, 257 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1958).
3. FLA. STAT. Ch. 175 (1957).
4. City of Miami v. Carter, 105 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1958).
5. FLA. STAT. § 636.261 (1957).
6. Larson v. Lesser, 106 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1958).
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words used may appear to be unreasonable, unduly harsh, or stringent, they
cannot be ignored, and other words may not be substituted for them. In
interpreting an insurance policy, courts must ascertain whether the words
used really leave a doubt or create an uncertainty which needs construction;
if not, the words of the policy control.7
The extent of intended insurance coverage, warranties, exceptions from
coverage and exclusions from intended liability are construed in accordance
with the plain meaning of the words used by the parties in their contract.
However, if the terms are ambiguous, equivocal, or uncertain to the extent
that the intention of the parties cannot be clearly ascertained they are to be
construed strictly and most strongly against the insurer and in favor of the
insured iin order to effectuate insurance rather than to defeat it. The courts
will not declare an ambiguity if the words used are plain and clearly indicate
the intent.
In a case of first impression, the court, attempting to construe insurance
policy terms, permitted evidence to be introduced by a national insurance
trade association to prove that it, as a service to its members, conducted
research surveys, compiled statistics and drafted proposed policy provisions
in addition to establishing recommended rates for various types of insurance
coverage. And, the association was permitted to declare what its intent
was as to the interpretation of such policy provisions. The court held that
if the association's interpretation was not authoritative it was very persuasive.
The court considered this evidence to be a valuable aid in construing th2
intent of the parties.
7. Nardelli v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co. of New York, 269 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1959)(for purpose of construction, trade association part in drafting policy is a persuasive, if
not an authoritative, aide to construction); Morgan v. E. J. Evans Co., 266 F.2d 423(5th Cir. 1959); Lineas Aereas Colombianas Exp. v. Travelers Fire Ins. Co., 257 F.2d
150 (5th Cir. 1958) (court cannot assay what factors the insurers considered to be of
underwriting importance); Zipperer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 254 F.2d 853
(5th Cir. 1958) (where no statutory prohibition, insurance company may restrict liability);
Craig Funeral Home v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 254 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1958)
(no ambiguity in words used, court will construe); I-lobbs v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 253
F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1958) (coverage not so restrictive as to dictate fraud or overreaching);
Stokes v. Travelers Ins. Co., 249 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1957) (action to recover for injuries
in auto accident held not maintainable under policy provision); Canal Ins. Co. v. Dough-
erty, 247 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1957) (construes warranty as to substitution of insured
vehicles); Balogh v. Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co., 167 F. Supp. 763 (S.D. Fla. 19581 ("all
risk" and "other insurance" clauses construed); Continental Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Mercury
F. & M. Ins. Co., 163 F. Supp. 325 (S.D. Fla. 1958) (construes "other insurance" clause);
Highway Cas. Co. v. Johnston, 104 So.2d 734 (Fla. 1958) (policy- unambiguous); King
v. Sturge, 113 So.2d 257 (Fla. App. 1959) (intent of parties must be used as guide to
interpretation of contract); Kimbro v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 112 So.2d 274 (Fla.
App. 1959) (neither court nor jury may alter terms of contract in suit); Frank v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 109 So.2d 594 (Fla. App. 1959) (auto theft policy not
ambiguous); Cochrane v. American Sur. Co. of New York, 108 So.2d 315 (Fla. App.
1959); Peninsular Life Ins. Co. v. Rosin, 104 So.2d 792 (Fla. App. 1958) (life insurance
application construed as unambiguous).
8. Nardelli v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co. of New York, 269 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1959).
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Vith the exception of the above case, the Florida law as to construction
of insurance contracts remains the same as hcretofore," in both state and
federal courts.
Exemptions
"Other insurance' clauses came before the courts for interpretation and
application. One case involved the mysterious loss of jewelry which was
consigned under an agreement that the consignee would pay the consignor
for any losses incurred. The consignor and the consignee each insured the
articles. The court concluded that the same person had the benefit of two
coverages, the one specific and the other blanket; therefore, the specific
covered the described pieces and the blanket type policy covered the other
jewelry.' 0
Another case invol'ed automobile liability insurance policies. The
insured owner of an automobile rented a motor vehicle which was insured
by another insurance company. Both policies contained the usual "other
insurance" clauses, which provided that the insurance of that policy was to
be liable pro-rata with other valid insurance, but that if such insurance was
as to "temporary substitute" vehicles, it was to be excess insurance over other
valid insurance. It was held that each company was obligated to contribute
its pro-rata share of any judgment recovered against the insured, but not
beyond its policy limits."
Exclusions
Provisions in insurance policies excepting or excluding certain types of
coverage are legal and will be enforced by the courts in favor of the insurers
and will be interpreted and construed in accordance with their plain intent
if not so unreasonably restrictive as to indicate fraud or overreaching. The
courts are without authority to make new contracts for the parties, or to
extend coverage, where none was intended. 2
An airline pilot's disability income insurance policy contained a pro-
vision to the effect that it did not cover disability or loss resulting from
injury sustained while other than "as a fare-paying passenger in a regularly
scheduled flight." The insured was acting as the co-pilot of an airplane when
9. As set forth in last survey article. See note 1 sulra.
10. Balogh v. Jewelers Mut.Ins. Co., 167 F. Supp. 763 (S.D. Fla. 1958).
11. Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 267 F,2d 817 (5th
Ci. 1959).
12. Lineas Aereas Colombianas Exp. v. Travelers Fire Ins. Co., 257 P.2d 150 (5thCir. 1958); Meyerson v. Jewelers Mut. ins. Co., 255 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1958); Craig
Funeral Home, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 254 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1958);Zipperer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 254 F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1958); Hobbs v.
Franklin Life Ins. Co., 253 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1958); Kimbro v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 112 So.2d 274 (Fla. App. 1959); Grand Assembly, etc. v. New Amsterdam Cas.Co., 102 So.2d 842 (Fl. App. 1958).
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it crashed into the Pacific Ocean. It was held that since he was not a fare-
paying passenger in the airplane at the time of his death, his death occurred
within the policy exception or exclusion and he was not insured at that
time.13 Even though the insured paid premiums for twelve years and the
insurance company knew that he was regularly employed during that time
as an airline pilot, the court stated that:
The coverage afforded is not so unreasonably restricted as to indi-
cate fraud or overreaching. . . .Under the circumstances of this
case, we think that the courts are without authority to make a new
contract for the parties, or to extend the coverage upon any theory
of waiver or estoppel.
The omnibus clause in an automobile liability policy contained the
exclusionary provision that the insurance did not apply to the insured
(anyone driving with the insured's permission w%as included among the
classed "insured") or any member of the insured's family residing in the
same household. The insured lent the automobile to a friend who drove it,
accompanied by the driver's stepson, who was under twenty-one years of
age and who resided with his mother and stepfather. The car was involved
in an accident and the stepson, being injured, brought an action against the
owner of the car, obtained a judgment against him, and garnisheed the
insurer claiming under the policy. It was held that insurance companies
"have the same right as individuals to impose such conditions as they wish
upon their obligations, not inconsistent with public policy, and the courts
are without right to add anything to their contracts, or to take anything
therefrom.""
An auto liability insurance policy on an ambulance provided that it did
not insure against liability while the vehicle was being used for "emergency
purposes." The court held that it was a jury question to decide whether
or not the automobile was being driven at the time of the accident for
"emergency purposes" when it was on a mission to obtain blood for a
patient undergoing an operation at the hospital.'3
An undertaker had one of his automobiles insured. The policy provided
that the coverage would not apply while the vehicle was being used for
carr ing persons for charge unless this use was specifically described and a
premium charged therefor. It also provided that the vehicle could be used
for passenger-carrying purposes "incidental to the insured's business" as a
funeral director. The court held that the language of the policy was not
ambiguous so as to permit parol evidence to explain any of its provisions and
went on to indicate that the question as to the meaning of "incidental to
the insured's business" could not be answered by the test of what was the
13. Hobbs v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., note 12 supra.
14. Zipperer v. State Farm Mut. Atio. Ins. Co., note 12 supra.
15. Grand Assembly, etc. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., note 12 supra.
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business of a funeral director generally considered, but rather what was the
business of this particular (insured) funeral director. Since he conducted a
livery business, such phase of his business was covered by the policy and the
intended exclusion did not apply."
rlihe insured, a wholesale and retail jeweler, consigned jewelry to a dealer
for display in his show window. The jewelry was stolen. The insurance
policy excluded from coverage any loss to property exhibited by the insured.
The court determined that a consignee was not the agent of the insured since
the relationship of agency does not arise as a matter of law (upon which to
found a summary judgment) out of the consignment of merchandise for
purpose of display: it is rather an issue of fact. 7
An airplane was insurcd for "all risk" hull damages, but the policy
provided that it should apply only while the airplane was being operated by
the insured's regular pilots who held licenses issued by the United States or
Columbian authorities. The airplane crashed while being controlled by
Mexican pilots not holding the required licenses. Such operation was contrary
to the instructions of the insured and the agreemnctt bctwccn the insured
and the operators of the plane. It was held that traditional notions of
proximate cause are not the test in determining whether a violation of policy
provisions suspends the coverage, since such suspension continues as long
as the proscribed activities continue.'
A life insurance policy provided for double indemnity in the case of
accidental death, but excluded self destruction. The court held that although
it is true that an insurance company may limit its liability and that neither
the court nor the jury may rewrite the contract, "it does not follow that the
parties to a private contract mav alter the rules of cvidence." An insurance
contract cannot require the insured to disprove every possible defense, such
as in this case that the death did not result from suicide."'
Conditions
The same legal principles are applied to conditions as are applied to
exclusions, exemptions and other provisions.
When a policy issued by plaintiff insurer (in an action for declaratory
udgienit to determine the liability between rcspcetive insurers) and the
policy issued by the defendant insurer to the same motorist providcd that if
there were other insurance, each would be responsible only for the excess
over any valid and collectible insurance, the respective excess insurance clauses
were ineffective and both insurance companies were primarily liable to the
insured. rhis is predicated on the basis that it was not the intent of the
16. Craig Funeral Home, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., note 12 supra.
17. Meyerson v. Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co., note 12 supra.
18. Lineas Aereas Colombianas Exp. v. Travelers Fire Ins. Co., note 12 supra.
19. Kimbro v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., note 12 supra.
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parties to provide that a second policy should extinguish the liability of both
policies. Therefore, each company remains primarily liable to the insured
on its respective policy. "
A conditional receipt, given beneficiary's husband, providing that insuir-
ance would take effect when the application was approved and accepted at
the home office, was a clear and unambiguous provision and no contract of
insurance took effect until such approval was effected. When the husband
died prior to such approval, there was no interim insurance on the husband's
life, even though the receipt provided that insurance would take effect from
the date of the application.2-
In an action upon an "all risk loss" insurance policy pertaining to
jewelry, the court held that substantial compliance with the condition which
required the insured to maintain a detailed and itemized inventory of his
property was sufficient to satisfy the policy provisions. Also, under Florida
law, a failure to file proof of loss in accordance with policy requirements,
does not work a forfeiture but simply postpones the time when suit can be
brought, and a late filing of proof of loss is sufficient, provided it is vithin
the statutory period for commencing suit. 2
\Vhen an attorney apparently represents an insured, but in fact is trying
the case on behalf of the insurer under the provisions of the policy, and
he discovers fraud and collusion on the part of the apparent client, he
should terminate his ostensible employment. The insurance company should
make the fraud and collusion of its insured the subject of a plenary action
between them to avoid liability for breach of a condition of the policy.
The attorney should not, in the negligence action, which he is defending for
the insured, make an issue of the fraud and collusion of his ostentible
client.23
An insurance policy was issued and delivered in Illinois to an Illinois
resident who paid the full premium there. The policy provided that suit
had to be commenced within twelve months after discovery of the loss. The
insured moved to Florida where his property was either stolen or destroyed.
A Florida statute provides that coutractual provisions shortening the period
of limitations are invalid. In an action brought two years after the loss,
the court held that to apply the Florida statute would not be consonant with
clue process of law, as the only contacts that Florida had with the policy
were the presence of the insured property and the beneficiary in the state.2 '
In another declaratory judgment action between two insurers as to their
rights under the "other insurance clauses" of each policy, the court main-
20. Continental Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Mercury F. & M. Ins. Co., 163 F. Stipp. 327
(S.D. Fla. 1958).
21. Peninsular Life Ins. Co. v. Rosin, 104 So.2d 792 (Fla. App, 1958).
22. Balogh v. lewelers Mut. Ins. Co., 167 F. Supp. 763 (S.D. Fla. 1958).
23. Spadar v. Palmisano, 109 So.2d 418 (Fla. App. 1959).
24. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 265 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1959).
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tained that each company was liable for its respective pro-rata share of
defense costs of a suit which was pending against an insured driver. The
driver insured by one company rented a motor vehicle which was insured
by the other company. The insured's policy excluded liability on a vehicle
other than the described motor vehicle unless it was furnished for regular
use to the insured. It was held that the rental motor vehicle having been in
use by insured for three weeks was within the coverage of the first company's
policy.25
Cancellation
Whether or not an insurance company successfully substituted one insur-
ance policy for a pre-existing policy and then cancelled the second policy
was a question of fact for the court sitting without a jury, which ruled in
favor of the insured.20
A policy provided that either party could cancel the insurance by
sending notice of cancellation to the policy address. The company sent a
notice of cancellation to the insured but failed to return the unearned prem-
ium with the notice. The court decided that the cancellation was effective
notwithstanding the fact that it was not accompanied by a tender of
unearned preium. Also, under Florida law, it was essential for the insured
to show that the insurer was guilty of conduct influencing insured into
believing that the policy was still in effect before the company could be
cstoppcd to claim the cancellation. 2
M\'IAKING TriE CoNraAc'r
Premiums
A life insurance policy provided for a grace period of one month (not
less than 30 days) during which period the policy should continue in force.
Quarterly payments were made on the 10th of November, February, May
and August. The assured made the last payment on May 10th and he died
on September 10th. The court held that in computing given periods of grace
in a policy, the first day should be excluded, in order to construe liberally
the policy in favor of the insured so as iot to defeat, without necessity, a
claim to indemnity.28
Application
A conditional receipt for life insurance contained a condition that the
insurance should not become effective until the application had been
approved and accepted by the home office of the company. The condition
25. Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 267 F.2d 817 (5th
Cir. 1959).
26. Harris v. State Farm Mdtt. Auto. Ins. Co., 157 F. Supp. 5 (N.D. Fla. 1957).
27. Jnhnson v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 162 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Fla. 1959).
28. Shoaf v. World Ins. Co., 162 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. F1a. 1958).
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was upheld and no insurance was effectcd when the application was not so
approved and accepted, even though the applicant had paid the first premium
in advance.29
Insurable Interest
A partnership has an insurable interest in all of its property, both real and
personal, since such propcrty is theoretically vested in the partnership entity.
Also, since no partner has the right to possess any of the partnership prop-
erty to the exclusion of the other partners, the interest of each partner
consists of that undivided portion of the partnership assets which may remain
after all partnership debts are paid.30 But where persons of a partnership
have agreed that one of the partners may maintain a separate business at a
location different from that of the partnership, such separate business is
not insured or covered by the partnership policy of insurance.
Agency
The use of a declaratory decree action to interpret an agency contract
for the sale of title insurance was approved in order to establish: (1) the
rights of the parties to the contract; (2) the rights of the agency and the
purchaser of the agent's business with respect to the records and files; and
(3) questions relating to the title policies written by the agent which were
included in the sale of the agent's title abstract business. In such circum-
stances, a declaratory action will lie regardless of whether the insurer lad
an adequate remedy by an action at law for replevin.;"
Existence of Insured Subject
Where the terms of a life insurance contract are plain and unambiguous
as to when it shall come into being, it will not be considered an unreasonable
requirement that the insured be alive and in good health on the date of
delivery of the policy.32
CONCEALMENTs, REPRESEN-rArIONS AND WARRANTIES
Under a motor truck cargo liability policy, the insured "warranted" to
report a substitution of described vehicles to the insurer within sevcnty-two
hours of such substitution and agreed to pay an additional premium, if
required. It was held that this was a continuing "privilege" of the insured,
and that once it decided to make a substitution, it was "required" to give
notice to the insurer. The policy was limited to the extent that prior accidents
29, Peninsular Life Ins, Co. v. Rosin, note 21 supra.
30. Cochrane v. American Stir. Co. of New York, 108 So.2d 315 (Vla. App. 1959).
31. Title & Trust Co. v. Title Company Guar. & Abstract Co.; 103 So.2d 211 (Fla.
App. 1958). The declaratory action also dealt with the appointment of a receiver.
32, Peninsular-Life- Ins. Co. v. Rosin, note 21 supra.,
1960]
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were to be deducted from the policy limitation. Two accidents did occur and
it was decided that since the insured did not give notice to the carrier of
the substitution of the vehicle in place of the vehicle lost by the first accident,
the company was not liable for the full amount of damage to the second
cargo, but was only liable to the extent of the balance of insurance remaining
after deducting the extent of cargo damages sustained in 'the first accident.
The court again reitcrated its stand that when the language was unambiguous
and not against public policy nor in violation of any statutory prohibition, it
will be construed in accordancc with the plain meaning of the language
used.:,:,
A jewelry salesman, who was the victim of an armed robbery on a train
at night, brought an action against his insurer on an "all risk" policy covering
jewelry against loss during travel between designated cities. The policy con-
tained a warranty clanse which provided that the jewelry would be carried in
a locked satchel during the day and would be locked in a hotel vault each
night. It was held that an insurance policy must be construed as a whole
in an attempt to determine the intent of the parties, and that the provision
that the jewelry be locked in a hotel vault each night was susceptible of
more than onc reasonable interpretation thereby creating an ambiguity which
precluded the entry of a summary judgment for either party?14
WAIVER OR ESTOPPL
When an insurer denies liability during the period prescribed for pre-
sentation of proofs of loss on grounds other than those relating to the proof
of loss, such denial of liability ordinarily will be considered as a waiver of
the policy requirements as to the filing of proof of loss with the insurer. :
The type and extent of insurance coverage under a policy cannot be
extended by waiver or estoppel. Therefore, an airline pilot who lost his life
while acting as a co-pilot contrary to an exclusion in the policy could not
recover even though the insurer knew he was employed and actively engaged
in that pursuit and collected premiums on its policy for twelve years with
this knowledge. 0
An insurer who refused to defend an action institutcd against its assured,
on the ground that such action was not within the coverage of the policy,
was not precluded from asserting non-coverage or non-insurance when the
judgment crcditor garnisheed the insurer; a denial of liability was not waived
by the insurer.37
33. Canal Ins. Co. v. Dougherty, 247 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1957) (a good cease
demonstrating that warranties in insurance policies are still considered and enforced).
34. King v. Sturge, 113 So.2d 257 (Fla. App. 1959).
35. Keel v. Independent Life & Ace. Ins. Co., 99 So.2d 225 (Fia. 1957). Bene-
ficiary advised insurer's agent of circumstances surrounding death of insured and filed
proofs of loss on separate ordinary life policy and agent denied any liability on accidental
death policy. Held: waiver of proof of loss under accidental death policy provisions.
,6. Hobbs v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., note 12 supra, at 593.
37. Zipperer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., note 12 supra.
[VOL. XIV
INSURANCE
When an automobile liability insurer sent a notice of cancellation of a
policy to the insured in accordance with the provisions of the policy, the
insured could not hold the insurer liable for costs of defending an action
against him on the theory of estoppel, unless the insured showed that the
insurer was guilty of conduct influencing the insured into believing that the
policy was still in effect,-",
An insured's participation in a negligence action and in the appeal
from the judgment recovered against it, on the ground that the judgment was
excessive, does not preclude it from suing its insurer for the latter's bad faith
in refusing to settle the negligence action.,0
Generally, an unconditional denial of liability within the period allowed
by an "all risk" jewelry policy for the filing of proof of loss, constitutes a
waiver of that requirement. Under Florida law, failure to file a proof of
loss does not work a forfeiture but simply postpones the time when suit
can be brought. 40
The insured named his wife as sole beneficiary. Thereafter in a fit of
rage, the husband shot his wife and then took his own life; the jury estab-
lished that the wife predeceased her husband. The court determined that
the murder of the wife did not work a forfeiture or otherwise prevent the
proceeds from being paid into insured's estate, since the insured was not
benefited materially by his crimc.4'
Section 455.06 of the Florida Statutes, which waives governmental
immunity from tort liability, applies only to an agency which acts and
serves as a state instrumentality and only to the extent of the insurance
coverage obtained by it. 42
RIIrs OF PARTIES
Policyholders-Insureds
An insured was in possession of a stock of goods immediately after a
fire. Certain suppliers assured him that if the insurers did not take the
goods for $4,900, the suppliers would take them for over $12,000. The court
determined that evidence of such outstanding assurances was not only rele-
vant and material to the inquiry as to the value of the stock immediately
after the fire, but the trie value of the stock at such time could not be
arrived at without such evidence.43
An insured is not entitled to costs of defense of an action when his
insurance policy had been properly cancelled before the occurrence which
was the basis for the action. 44
38. Johnson v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., note 27 supra.
39. American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Greyhound Corp., 258 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1958).
40. Balogh v. Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co., note 10 suora.41. Robbins v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 168 F. Supp. 668 (N.D. Fla. 1958).
42. Moreno v. Aldrich, 113 So.2d 406 (Fla. App. 1959).
43. Pennsylvania Lumbermens Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Nichols, 253 F.2d 504 (5th
Cir. 1958).
44. Johnson v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., note 27 supra.
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When an insured kills his wife, the beneficiary, and then shoots himself,
the proceeds of the policy should be paid into the insured's estate. 45
The questions of whether or not the insured sustained a loss and the
extent of such losses, under the terms of accident benefit insurance policies,
were properly submitted to the jury for detemination."'
In a workmen's compensation case, the court held that the deputy
commissioner was in error in his refusal to receive evidence and make findings
as to the intent of the parties as to which one of two insurance policies was
in effect as to the one employer.47
Beneficiary
Under Florida law, a beneficiary's interest in a life policy, which reserves
to the insured the right to change the beneficiary, is an expectancy only, and
the insured remains in effect the real owner of the policy. When the right
to change the beneficiary is not reserved, the beneficiary's interest becomes
vested when the policy is issued and the beneficiary in effect becomes the
real owner of the policy and any claim he might have is against the insurer
and not the insured. In such event, the beneficiary's interest is not embraced
by a separation agreement providing for a release by the parties of all claims
against each other.48
Generally, divorce alone does not automatically divest the wife of the
proceeds of life insurance as a beneficiary, although her interests may be
terminated by an agreement between the parties.19
When a separation agreement between husband (insured) and wife
(beneficiary) provided that upon performance of all of the terms of such
agreement, all claims against each other were released, and the policies
reserved the right in the insured to change the beneficiary, the designated
beneficiary was precluded from recovering or retaining the policy proceeds °0
When the beneficiary predeceases the insured the insurance proceeds
revert to the insured or his estate, even if the insured killed his beneficiary
and then shot himself.5
A corporation, as beneficiary, paid the premiums on an endowment
policy which had been issued on the life of its stockholder-officer-director
in order for it to purchase the insured's stock interest in the corporation
45. Robbins v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, note 41 supra.
46. Guaranty Life Ins. Co. of Florida v. Jackson, 113 So.2d 256 (Fla. App. 1959).
- 47. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co. v. King, 114 So.2d 184 (Fla. App. 1959). This
case follows the decision in Blumberg v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 51 So.2d 182 (Fla.
1951).
48. O'Brien v. Elder, 250 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1957).
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Robbins v. Prudential Ins. Co. of -America, note 41. supra.
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upon his death. The insurance policy provided that if the insured was living
on or after a certain date, he was to receive the monthly payments from the
proceeds of the endowment policy until his death and any net proceeds
remaining after his death were to be paid to the beneficiary. It was therefore
held that the corporation had no claim upon the monthly payments to the
insured.52
A widow sued her husband's brother for the proceeds of her husband's
life insurance policy. The court found that the deceased husband, during
his life, under a reservation of right to change the beneficiary, did in fact
properly change the designation of his wife as beneficiary to that of his
brother, thereby precluding his widow from any right in the proceeds of
that policy? 3
Creditors of Insured
Generally a Florida insured is entitled to exemption from execution or
levy on the cash surrender values of his life insurance policies? 4 However,
when a husband was a citizen of California at the time he asserted his right
to exemption from the claims of his wife in Florida, he was not entitled to
such statutory exemption, even though he was a resident of Florida when the
policies were issued.6
In another case between a former husband and wife when the wife
attempted to assert her rights against the policy proceeds of her husband,
she was not as successful. The parties had entered into a settlement agree-
ment which became a part of the divorce decree, and the court held that
this released his ex-wife's claims agains his life insurance policies."
When the insured's jndgment creditor brought garnishment proceedings
against the insured's liability insurer, it was entitled to recover the interest
on that part of the claim which was not deposited in court.7
Creditors of Insurer
Agents of an insolvent insurance company in receivership held funds
derived in payment of premiums of insurance, and such funds were not
turned over to the insurer before its adjudication of insolvency. The receiver
was entitled to possess such funds as assets of the insolvent insurer, even
though the policyholders had assigned to the agent their claims for unearned
52. Morgan v. E. J. Evans Co., 266 I.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1959).
53. Lemer v. Lerner, 113 So.2d 212 (Fla. App. 1959).
54. FA. STAT. § 222.15 (1957).
55, Marshall v. Bacon, 97 So.2d 252 (Fla. 1957).
56. O'Brien v. Elder, note 48 supra.
57. Highway Gas. Co. v. Johnston, 104 So.2d 734 (Fla. 1958),
1960]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
premiums due to cancellation of their respective policies after such
insolvency. s6
Landlord and Tenant
A government lease of a shipyard required the tenant to maintain and
improve the property and to procure and maintain fire insurance in definitely
specified amounts. Hence, the government (as landlord) was entitled to the
proceeds of the insurance in the full and specified amounts, not merely to
the extent of the market value, even though the lessee had paid extensive
premiums and spent large sums in rehabilitation and improvnent of the
property, as required by the lease. The tenant's obligations were all regarded
as consideration for the lease and were not dependent on each other. 59
Bailor-Bailee-Consignment
In actions by insureds for loss of jewelry allegedly covered by "all risk"
policies issued by defendant-insurers, when the insured-consignee of the lost
jewelry was liable for the loss to the consigor due to failure to exercise
proper care for the jewelry, the insurance on the jewelry carried by the
consignor-bailor did not constitute "other risk" insurance. Therefore, the
consignee was entitled to recover for the loss from his own insurer despite
the "other insurance" clause in his policy.60 The insurance obtained by the
consignor had no relationship with the insurance obtained by the consignee,
even though they both covered the same articles. Each had a separate
property and insurable interest in the articles.
Agents
The use of the word "consignment" (or words of like import) does not
of itself as a matter of law, create the relationship of principal and agent.
It is a question of fact from the context of the documents creating the
relationship as to whether for purposes of an insurance policy an agency rela-
tionship or a bailor-bailee relationship was created."
Insurance agents are not entitled to retain premium payments due an
insolvent insurance company even if the policies upon which they were
paid were cancelled and the insureds were entitled to a return of unearned
premiums, These funds belong to the receiver of the defunct insurance
corporation. 2
58. Charles W. Virgin Ins. Agency v. Alabama Gen. Ins. Co., 114 So,2d 524 (Fla.App. 19195A9. nited States v. Seaboard Mach. Corp., 256 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1958).
60. Balogh v. Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co., note 10 supra.
61. Meyerson v. Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co., note 12 supra.
62. Charles W. Virgin Ins. Agency v. Alabama Gen. Ins. Co., note 58 supra.
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Excess or Co-Insurer
When a policy issued by plaintiff insurer and a policy issued by defend-
ant insurer to the same motorist provided that if there were other insurance,
each would be responsible only for the excess over any other valid and col-
lectible insurance, these excess clauses were ineffective and both companies
were primarily liable to the insured. However, when the defendant insurer's
policy contains a provision to the effect that it is not liable for a greater
portion of such loss than the applicable limit of liability that its policy bears
to the total applicable limit of liability of all valid and collectible insurance,
the provision is effective to limit its liability to a pro-rata contribution in
proportion to the amount its respective insurance policy bears to the total
amount of the combined policics.,"
Thc effect to be given exclusionary clauses found in policies has been
catogorized by different criteria to determine on which insurer the liability
will fall, e.g., as (I ) priority in time of the policies; (2) which policy is the
more specific; (3) the exact wording of the particular exclusionary clauses.01
Total or Partial Disability
Whether or not an insured suffered a partial or total disability is a
question of fact for the jury and if the court is trying the case without a
jury, then it is for the court as a question of fact. The trial judge's
determination will not be reversed if there are any facts in the record upon
which such finding is based."-
SERVICE OF PROCESS ON AN UNAUTHORIZED INSURER
A Missouri corporation issued its marine insurance policy to a Florida
corporation, delivered it in Florida and had it countersigned by a Florida
resident agent under the endorsement, "This policy is hereby countersigned
below by a resident agent of the State of Florida, to comply with the resident
agent's law of said State." By such act, the insurer designated the resident
agent under section 625.33(3) of the Florida Statutes as an "unauthorized
insurer."6 6 Hence, service upon him was valid.
63. Continental Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Mercury F. & M. Ins. Co., note 20 suopra.
64. Cf. Annot., 122 A.L.R. 1204 (1939); Balogh'v. Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co., note 10
supra. See also Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d 958
(9th Cir. 1952). Where, however, there are two policies applicable to one situation, one
policy specific and the other general, ef. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v.
Cochran Oil Mill & Cinnery Co., 26 Ga. App. 288, 105 S.E. 856 (1921); Trinity
Universal Ins. Co. v. General Ace. Fire & Life Ass. Corp., 138 Ohio St. 488, 35
N.E.2d 838 (1941).
65. Continental Cas. Co. v. Stokes, 249 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1957).
66. Kansas City Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Dan Arias Shrimp Co., 261 F.2d 490
(5th Cir. 1958).
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SUBROGATION
An insurer cannot deny an insured recovery under a policy merely
because the insured has a cause of action against a third person who carries
like insurance for the occurrence. The insurer is liable to its insured and
then becomes subrogated against the third party and its insurer for the loss.7
The remedy of subrogation does not justify the application of the "other
insurance clause" to the transaction.
An insured commenced an action against a third party for damages to
his person and to his automobile, and at the trial, the judge sustained the
third party's objection to evidence showing damage to the insured's automo-
bile on the ground that the insured bad already been paid for such loss from
his collision insurer. A verdict in favor of the insured was entered for the
personal injury damages and a final judgment was entered. The insured
accepted payment of that judgment without moving for a new trial or
appealing from the court's ruling on its refusal to admit the evidence of the
damage to the automobile. The court decided that the insured did not dis-
charge his fiduciary obligation to his collision insurer to protect its subroga-
tion rights against the third party, and therefore the collision insurer was
entitled to recover from its insured the amount it paid him under the col-
lision policy.8 The insured had only one cause of action against the third
party. Florida does not recognize any splitting of causes of action.
WoRDS AND PHRASES
The following words and phrases have been defined during the period
of this survey:
"accident" 0
"All risk"70
"bodily or accidental injury"7'
"carrying passengers for hire"72
"direct and accidental loss or damage to auto"a
"external cause'' 74
67, Balogh v. Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co., note 10 supra.
68. Titus v. Emmco Ins. Co., 109 So.2d 781 (Fla. App. 1959).
69. Christ v. Progressive Fire Ins. Co., 101 So.2d 821 (Fla. App. 1958) (where
roofing contractor left repair job unfinished over weekend without proper precautions,
leakage of rain water into storerooms was not an "accident").
70. Balogh v. Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co., note 10 supra; Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v.
Tori Bros, Ltd., 106 So.2d 916 (Fla. App. 1958).
71. Stokes v. Travelers Ins. Co., 249 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1957). But cf. companion
case with opposite result, Continental Cas. Co. v. Stokes, note 65 supra.
72. Craig Funeral Home v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., note 12 supra.
73. Frank v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 109 So.2d 594 (Fla. App. 1959)
(theft of auto which was located by insurer and insured advised of the location of same
was not such loss under theft policy as to sustain insured's action for damages).
74. Hawkeye.Security Ins. Co. v. lort Bros, Ltd., 106 So.2d 916 (Fla. App. 1958)
(damage to a cab caused by the falling of a dragline boom construed within policy
provision).
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"Emergency purpose" 75
"external, violent and accidental means" 76
"mysterious disappearance" 7
"total loss" 8
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT
When an insured was without fault in having a notice of pending action
against it until after default judgment had been rendered, the insurer was
not excused from defending the action and was liable to the insured for
expenses in setting aside the default judgment.79
An insured is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees from an insurer which
refused to defend an action against the insured, but the insured is not entitled
to an allowance of attorneys' fees for a successful prosecution of an appeal
from an order which set aside the verdict in favor of the insured and granted
a new trial.,"
When an insurer rightfully cancels an insurance policy in accordance
with the tenns thereof before the insured has suffered a loss, the insurer is
not liable to the insured for attorneys' fees and costs incurred by the insured
in defending an action by a third party.8 '
When an insured successfully sued an insurer for exercising bad faith
in the settlement of a tort claim against the insured, the insured is entitled
to recover attorneys' fees under section 625.08 of the Florida Statutes as a
successful litigant.82
When a non-resident insurer issued a marine policy as an unauthorized
insurer, it came within the exemption provisions of section 625.33 and it was
not liable for attorneys' fees in an action by a successful insured. 3
LIABILITY OF INSURER IN EXCESS Or POLICY LIMIrrs
When an insured brought an action against its insurer for an excess of
policy limits for exercising bad faith in the settlement of a tort action against
the insured, evidence of reinsurance was material, even if the insurer's claim
adjusters had no knowledge of the existence of such insurance, when the
insurer's home office did have knowledge thereof and had placed a limit on
the amount of settlement. When it appeared that liability policy limits
75. Grand Assembly, etc. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., note 12 supra.
76. Kimbro v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., note 12 supra.
77. Balogh v. Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co., note 10 supra.
78. Continental Cas. Co. v. Stokes, note 65 supra.
79. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Valdosta Milling Co., 253 F.2d 667 (5th
Cir, 1958).
80. Grand Assembly, etc. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co.. note 12 supra.
81. Johnson v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., note 27 supra.
82. American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Greyhound Corp., note 39 supra.
83. Kansas City Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Dan Arias Shrimp Co,, note 66 supra.
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might not be sufficient to satisfy a tort claim against the insured and that
the excess or reinsurance carrier had disclaimed liability, the insured was
entitled to exercise the privilege, offered by its insurer, of participating in
litigation (to protect its uninsured potential liability) without prejudicing
its claim against its insurer for exercising bad faith in the settlement
negotiations.8 4
An insurer is liable only to its insured, if at all, for tile exercise of bad
faith in settlement of a tort action by third-party claimants against its insured.
The plaintiff, who had recovered a judgment against the insured in excess
of an insurance liability policy limit cannot maintain any action against its
judgment debtor's insurer on any theory of negligence or bad faith in the
conduct of its negotiations for settlement of the tort action. The relationship
upon which such an action may be maintained exists only between the
insured and insurer and unless the insurance policy is for the benefit of a
third party, the third party has no rights by virtue of the contract.0
CONFLIC' OF LAWS
A resident of Illinois obtained a personal property floater policy insuring
his personal property located in Illinois from an insurer (not a Florida cor-
poration) and paid the premium in full. Hc then moved to Florida with his
insured chattels. While a resident of Florida, his chattels were either stolen
or destroyed. The policy, as delivered to insured and under the provisions
of the Illinois law, contained a clause that required actions on the policy to
be instituted within twelve months after discovery of the loss or they were
barred. The court held that this was an Illinois contract, tile laws of Illinois
applied, and the Florida Statute (section 95.03 which forbids agreements
shortening the statute of limitations) did not apply. This limitation pro-
vision is a substantial property right in the insurer and is protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Hence, when the action was
brought without the limitation period, a violation of due process would
result if the Florida Statute were applied.80
MISCELLANEOUS
In an action to recover damages for the alleged negligent operation of an
automobile, plaintiff sought by discovery proceedings to obtain information
as to the limits of the defendant's liability insurance. It was held that such
infornation was not a proper subject for discovery; an adverse ruling by the
trial court was subject to review by certiorari to avoid irreparable harm,
even though the order was interlocutory."'
84. American Fid, & Cas. Co. v. Greyhound Corp., note 39 supra.
85. Canal Ins. Co. of Greenville, Soith Carolina v. Sturgis, 114 So.2d 469 (Fla.
App. 1959).
86. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 265 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1959).
87. Brooks v. Owen, 97 So.2d 693 (Fla. 1957).
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On the theory of unfair competition, an automobile association and its
agents and employees were enjoined from using the same name as an insur-
ance company.8
A state agency's immunity from liability for tort is waived only to the
extent of insurance coverage obtained by it pursuant to statutes.8
88. All State Ins. Co. v. Allstate Auto. Ass'n, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 107 (S.D. Fla.
1959).
89. FLA. STAT. § 455.06 (1957); Moreno v. Aldrich, note 42 supra (dealing with
Caine and Fresh Water Fish Commission, FLA; CONST., Art. IV, § 30).
